The Supreme Court/The Supreme Court.iso/pc/wordperf/1991/91_1030a/91_1030a.zs

Text File | 1993-04-20 | 6KB | 96 lines

 NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being
done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.  The
syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared
by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.  See United                                                                     ______
States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.______    ___________________

                       SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                                    Syllabus

                               WITHROW v. WILLIAMS                                      ____

     CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

         No. 91-1030.   Argued November 3, 1992 - Decided April 21, 1993

After a police sergeant threatened to ``lock [him] up'' during a station house
 interrogation about a double murder, respondent Williams made inculpatory
 statements.  He was then advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384                                                      _______    ________
 U. S. 436, waived those rights, and made more inculpatory statements.  The
 Michigan trial court declined to suppress his statements on the ground that he
 had been given timely Miranda warnings, and he was convicted of first-degree                       _______
 murder and related crimes.  Williams subsequently commenced this habeas action
 pro se, alleging a Miranda violation as his principal ground for relief.  The _______            _______
 District Court granted relief, finding that all statements made between the
 sergeant's incarceration threat and Williams' receipt of Miranda warnings                                                          _______
 should have been suppressed.  Without conducting an evidentiary hearing or
 entertaining argument, the court also ruled that the statements Williams made
 after receiving the Miranda warnings should have been suppressed as                     _______
 involuntary under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The
 Court of Appeals agreed on both points and affirmed, summarily rejecting the
 argument that the rule in Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 - that when a State                           _____    _______
 has given a full and fair chance to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim, federal
 habeas review is not available to a state prisoner alleging that his
 conviction rests on evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search or
 seizure - should apply to bar habeas review of Williams' Miranda claim.                                                          _______

Held:_____
   1.  Stone's restriction on the exercise of federal habeas jurisdiction does       _____
 not extend to a state prisoner's claim that his conviction rests on statements
 obtained in violation of the Miranda safeguards.  The                              ________
















                                                                    I           II                             WITHROW v. WILLIAMS                                      ____

                                    Syllabus

 Stone rule was not jurisdictional in nature, but was based on prudential _____
 concerns counseling against applying the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule of
 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, on collateral review.  Miranda differs from Mapp ____    _____                                       _______              ____
 with respect to such concerns, and Stone consequently does not apply.  In                                    _____
 contrast to Mapp, Miranda safeguards a fundamental trial right by protecting a             _____ _______
 defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  Moreover,
 Miranda facilitates the correct ascertainment of guilt by guarding against the _______
 use of unreliable statements at trial.  Finally, and most importantly,
 eliminating review of Miranda claims would not significantly benefit the                       _______
 federal courts in their exercise of habeas jurisdiction, or advance the cause
 of federalism in any substantial way.  The burdens placed on busy federal
 courts would not be lightened, since it is reasonable to suppose that
 virtually every barred Miranda claim would simply be recast as a due process                        _______
 claim that the particular conviction rested on an involuntary confession.
 Furthermore, it is not reasonable to expect that, after 27 years of Miranda,                                                                     ________
 the overturning of state convictions on the basis of that case will occur
 frequently enough to be a substantial cost of review or to raise federal-state
 tensions to an appreciable degree.  Pp. 4-14.
   2.  The District Court erred in considering the involuntariness of the
 statements Williams made after receiving the Miranda warnings.  The habeas                                              _______
 petition raised no independent due process claim, and the record is devoid of
 any indication that petitioner consented under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
 15(b) to the determination of such a claim.  Moreover, petitioner was
 manifestly prejudiced by the court's failure to afford her an opportunity to
 present evidence bearing on that claim's resolution.  Pp. 14-15.

944 F. 2d 284, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

 SOUTER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Part
III, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and IV, in which
WHITE, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined.  O'CONNOR, J., filed an
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which REHNQUIST, C. J.,
joined.  SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part,
in which THOMAS, J., joined.